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Ownership reform in China's 
township and village enterprises 
Sun Laixiang 
The rise of China's rural ~nterprises, and especially township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), has been one of the most striking features of the country's 
economic development since the late r97os. By r995, industrial TVEs had 
overtaken state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in terms of the total value of their 
production and thus had become the largest single contributor to China's 
industrial production. During r995-2000, they produced over 30% of the 
national totals of industrial value-added, profits and output. Despite the 
decline in their relative position since r996, in 2001 TVEs across the non-
agricultural sector accounted for u.s°Ai of China's gross domestic product.1 
Before recent ownership reforms, a typical TVE could best be characterized 
as a community enterprise controlled by its local government, the control 
being mainly in the form of decisions over personnel and key resources.• 
TVEs were either collectively established by rural communities in townships 
and villages, or closely associated with them. In official statistics in the r98os 
and r99os, rural enterprises were classified into four categories: township-run 
(xiangban), village-run (cunban), those owned by a group of households 
(lianhu, mainly partnerships) and those owned by an individual household 
(geti, a sole proprietorship employing less than eight employees). For present 
purposes, we restrict ourselves to TVE firms in the first two categories. 
Although in the re~ent wave of ownership restructuring, most small 
TVEs have been sold outright to their managers and/or others, larger TVEs 
have developed joint ownership structures involving managers, local govern-
ment, workers and outside investors.3 Local governments have continued to 
be involved in the operations of the restructured firms via shares held by local 
state asset management bureaux and the firm's Communist Party branch. 
However, the government's role has generally been transformed, from sole 
owner and supervisor of the firms to major institutional shareholder. 
Tables 5-I and 5.2 show the distribution of ownership forms across all 
rural enterprises in 2002. Table 5-I shows ownership among firms in the 
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official, broad definition of the 'collective; TVE sector. Table 5.2 compares 
those firms to officially defined private firms and household-run firms. Table 
s.r indicates that by year-end 2002 about a half oflarge TVEs (in terms of the 
number of firms and employees), and some 60% of firms (in terms of value 
added and fixed assets) had been restructured. The resulting firms included 
joint-stock cooperatives, jointly run businesses, limited liability companies, 
shareholding 'companies and Sino-overseas joint ventures, in all of which 
local governments typically had a minority stake or from which they had 
exited completely. Although about a half of large TVEs remained in the 
narrowly defined collective category, the definition of this category has been 
changed to include those firms in which the local government holds a 
majority stake. Table 5.2 shows how significant the scale of full privatization 
· has been in recent years. Some 40% of firms in the privately owned category 
are in fact fully privatized small TVEs.4 
The pattern indicated by the official statistics is supported by several 
surveys.5 Table 5.3 summarizes the ownership patterns derived from a census 
in 43 townships in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces conducted in 2000 by Li 
Hongbin and Scott Rozelle. During 1993-9, of 390 collective TVEs, 222 
(sf!O) were fully privatized; 82 (21%) were restructured with the township 
government retaining a minority stake; 31 (8%) were restructured with the 
township government retaining a majority stake; and 55 (4%) remained 
under full government ownership (the only change being that many were 
operating with management responsibility contracts). 
Despite the variety of legal forms in the official registrations that 
restructured TVEs have taken up, they share a number of features in terms of 
their shareholding structure and control rights allocation. These features are 
si:unmarized as follows: 
(a) In the early years of restructuring, mainly before 1996, managers and 
employees together owned a majority of the total shares of the firm, and 
the relative size of their holdings differed because of the size of their cash 
subscriptions. 
(b) Shareholdings have become increasingly concentrated among small 
groups of senior managers, and management groups have become keener 
to buy back workers' shares. 
(c) The firms are often closely held, meaning that ownership is not freely 
tradable, although subscribed shares can be transferred within the local 
community. 
(d) Local governments may hold a large number of collective shares in the 
name of the community's citizens. 
(e) In addition to the shares held by firm insiders and local government, 
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Table 5.1: The distribution of ownership forms in China's TVEs, year-end 2002 
Ownership farm Number of firms Employment Value added Fixed assets Employees Value- Fixed assets 
(net) per firm added per per firm 
ooos Proportion ooos Proportion Rmbm Proportion Rmbm Proportion firm (Rmbooo) (Rmbooo) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Collective 401 54.86 17,858 46.98 482,146 39.95 526,088 40.91 44.5 l,202 l,312 
Joint-stock cooperative 79 lo.81 3,648 9.60 131,090 lo.86 121,941 9.48 46.2 1,659 1,544 
Jointly run firms 29 3.97 715 I.88 24,798 2.05 20,686 I.6I 24.7 855 713 
Limited liability firms 150 20.52 7,865 20.69 268,307 22.23 272,306 21.18 52·4 l,789 l,815 
Shareholding firms 17 2.33 l,429 J.76 60,387 5.00 67,171 5.22 84.1 3,552 3,951 
Joint venture firms 55 7.52 6,496 17.09 240,007 19.89 277,764 2I.60 II8.l 4,364 5,050 
Subtotal of collective and 
partly privatized firms 731 100.00 38,orr I00.00 l,206,735 I00.00 l,285,956 100.00 52.0 l,651 l,759 
Source-. Yearbook of China's Township and Village Enterprises (2003: l30jl, 420, 422, 424). 
Table 5.2: The distribution of ownership forms in China's rural enterprises, year-end 2002 
Ownership farm Number of firms Employment Value added Fixed assets Employees Value- Fixed assets 
(net) per.firm added per per.firm 
ooos Proportion ooos Proportion Rmbm Proportion Rmbm Proportion firm (Rmbooo) (Rmbooo) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Collective and partly 
privatized firms 731 3.43 38,orr 28.61 l,206,n5 37-26 1,285,956 47.78 52.0 1,651 1,759 
Privately owned fmri~ 2,29'8 I0}8 35,022 26 .36 881,798 27.23 752,417 2r96 15.2 384 327 
Household firms 18,297 85.80 59,843 45.04 1,150,048 35.51 652,854 24.26 3.3 63 36 
Total rural firms 21,326 I00.00 132,876 I00.00 3,238,581 loo.oo 2,691,227 100.00 
Source-. Yearbook of China's Township and Village Entertn·ises (2003: IJO--:JI, 420, 422, 424). 
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there are usually some (or even ·a large number of) shares held by 
outsiders that carry one vote per share (whereas insiders often have 
greater influence as shareholders). 
(f) A representative form of governance (one person, one vote or one share, 
one vote, a shareholders' meeting and a board of directors) is nominally 
employed, but in practice the firm's management is in charge. 
(g) Lay-offs of employee-shareholders have been common. When they 
leave the firm, employees may hold on to their shares or may sell them 
back to the management group. 
The performance of restructured TVEs has been outstanding, partly 
thanks to the capital that was raised by the injection of equity from new 
shareholders. In provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Anhui, leading 
areas ofTVE development, the initial share subscription led to an immediate 
average reduction of the debt-asset ratio by 10 percentage points. More 
importantly, it is widely acknowledged that restructuring has played the 
leading role in maintaining the TVE growth miracle. In 1995-2002, the size 
of the TVE sector decreased by almost half in terms of the number of firms 
and employees, thanks to the privatization of small TVEs. However, the 
value-added created by the sector had an annual real growth rate of 3.fAi.6 
This is an impressive achievement. 
Why was it that local government-owned TVEs rather than private firms 
made the biggest contribution to China's economic growth during the first 
two decades of the reform? A large body of literature has attempted to 
answer this question. At its core is the insight that local government 
ownership can be a second-best arrangement when there are few constraints 
on the government's predatory and rent-seeking behaviour.7 In other words, · 
Table 5.3: The equity position of the township government in 2000 after 
ownership reform and privatization in 199J-9 in township enterprises in 
43 townships 
Equity position of the township government Number of Proportion 
(TG) enterprises of total(%) 
TG position= roe% (collective) 55 14 
50%.,; TG position < 190% (collective) 31 8 
o < TG position < 50% (restructured) 82 21 
TG position= o (privately owned) 222 57 
Total 390 IOO 
Source: Figures in this table are derived from Table 2 and the corresponding text in Li and 
Rozelle (2003: 988). 
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local government ownership acts as a commitment mechanism to limit the 
government's own rent-seeking activities and to constrain the predatory 
behaviour of central government. Given this explanation, the recent wave of 
ownership change raises a number of important questions. What factors 
have driven this change? Given that the orthodox explanation did not predict 
change, is it still a useful explanation of the success of the TVE sector? And, 
finally, what explains the success of the new joint ownership arrangements? 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section examines 
the various theoretical explanations put forward for the dominance of local 
government-owned firms in rural China's industrialization. The second 
section focuses o.n the factors that drove the privatization wave of the mid-
199os and explains its major features, particularly the phenomenon of 
'privatization with a tail' and the screening functions associated with it. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of 'adaptive efficiency' 
in the governance and ownership structures of China's TVEs. 
THE DOMINANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN TVE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980s 
Why did local government ownership dominate private ownership in the 
industrial boom that took place in rural China in the r98os? Much research 
has focused on the underdevelopment of input markets and thus on the 
important benefits of cooperation between government officials, who control 
critical inputs, and entrepreneurs, who initiate and manage the firms. These 
critical inputs include not only material inputs such as land, electricity and 
key materials but also access to bank loans, business licences, official distri-
bution channels and political support. Although state ownership undermines 
financial incentives and may facilitate administrative interference, much of 
the literature on China's TVEs argues that the advantages of government 
ownership outweigh the disadvantages.8 
A key assumption in this literature is that local governments are bene-
volent, have incentives to increase local commercial activity and production 
and are willing to cooperate with entrepreneurs to achieve certain goals. This 
assumption seems plausible in the context of rural China because local 
officials are likely to be interested in increasing local fiscal revenue, creating 
off-farm employment and raising per capita income. A benevolent local govern-
ment is therefore a credible assumption. However, in a political system with 
inadequate mechanisms to check and balance the actions of local officials 
and to hold them accountable, there are also clear incentives for these 
officials to engage in rent-seeking and corruption. By allowing officials to 
have control rights over their firms, TVE managers can therefore never be 
94 
Ownership reform in China's township and village enterprises 
sure about to what extent local officials will interfere. This commitment 
problem means that the ex ante effort level of the managers may be seriously 
undermined - and if so, the role of local government is clearly counter-
productive. Another problem with this literature is that it does not answer 
the classic question posed by Ronald Coase in his seminal paper 'The Nature 
of the Firm': why does the boundary of the firm lie where it does?9 In the 
TVE context, why cannot the transaction of such critical inputs controlled 
by officials take place in the market (for example, through bribery) and why 
does the firm need to grant the local government ownership of the furn? 
To answer these problems, Che Jiahua examines the trade-offs involved 
in TVE ownership choices, assuming rent-seeking by local government 
officials.'0 By examining these incentive trade-offs in three stages (ex ante, 
interim and ex post), Che demonstrates that under certain conditions local 
government ownership can act as a commitment mechanism to limit the 
rent-seeking activities of officials. A simplified version of the story is related 
here. A manager needs to make an effort to initiate an investment project. 
After the project is initiated, a critical input is required. A governinent 
bureau is in charge of the allocation of the input. The bureau is not held 
accountable for its actions, and may collect a fee in addition to the official 
price levied for allocating the input. Once this critical input is allocated, the 
manager makes another effort in order that the project generates revenue. If 
the firm is privately owned, then after the initial effort is sunk, the 
government bureau can be expected to charge a fee that equals the manager's 
net ex-post payoff. Anticipating this predatory behaviour, the manager would 
not .injtiate the project. 
In contrast, if the firm is wholly or partly owned by the local government, 
then the bureau may be less predatory. The manager would thus be willing to 
initiate the project, and local government ownership would be beneficial.1 
Che models two aspects of the benefits that accrue to the local government 
with an ownership stake. First, the government receives a share of the firm's 
revenues. Second, the bureau can influence the firm's employment policy in 
order to create additional jobs, which of course undermines the firm's profits. 
The local government receives benefits from three sources: the fee linked to 
the allocation of the input, the share of the firm's revenue and the political 
benefits associated with excess employment. Che then models two types of 
government bureau - one 'pro-business' and the other 'pro-politics', depending 
on how much importance the bureau places on the over-staffing. This impor-
tance is the bureau's private information and is not disclosed to the firms. 
The fee charged for allocating the key input can signal the type of bureau 
- 'pro-politics' or 'pro-business'. A 'pro-business' bureau has incentives to 
charge a low fee and to force the firm to hire fewer numbers of excess 
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workers. Such actions signal to the firm's manager that the bureau is 'pro-
business', and as a consequence the manager will have a greater incentive to 
invest more effort in production. In contrast, in a separate equilibrium, a 
'pro-politics' bureau will fully exploit its bargaining power and charge a fee 
equal to the manager's net ex post payoff. A 'pro-business' bureau will signal 
its orientation by charging less than the manager's ex post payoff; and, antici-
pating that, as on average the project vvill bring positive benefits to the manager, 
he/she will have an ex ante incentive to initiate the project. In summary, this 
analysis suggests that local government ownership creates incentives for the 
government to limit its rent-seeking activities and even to support the firms 
it owns. In contrast, local government will have no incentives to limit its 
predation on private firms, and so, in this context, government-owned firms 
will perform better. 
In an authoritarian political system, the central government can also operate 
as a rent-seeker and predator on the non-state sector. Can local government 
ownership also act to limit predatory behaviour on the part of the central 
government? Che Jiahua and Qian Yingyi develop a theory in an attempt to 
answer this question.n In an environment lacking secure property rights and 
in which firms are vulnerable to rent-seeking activities by officials, private 
ownership of firms leads to the hiding of revenues. At the same time, firms' 
ownership by the central government fails to provide credible performance 
incentives for both managers and local governments. In contrast, local govern-
ment ownership integrates the normal government activities of.providing 
local public goods and the commercial function of the controlling firm, both 
of which serve the interests of the national government. Local governments 
are more likely to invest revenue from their firms in local public goods than 
are private entrepreneurs because local governments have a credible expec-
tation of capturing future revenues. Such investments also benefit the central 
government. Given this, the central government will be less likely to prey on 
local government-owned TVEs than on private enterprises. This in turn 
means that local governments will be less worried about revenue confiscation, 
and the extent of hiding of revenue by TVEs is also reduced. In summary, 
the ownership of firms by local government not only benefits both local and 
central government but can also result in greater provision of public goods. 
How will TVE ownership structures evolve as market reforms mature? 
Both strands of literature surveyed above - that which views government as 
predominantly predatory and that which sees government as predominantly 
benevolent - suggest that a gradual exit oflocal government from ownership 
will occur as markets for inputs develop, as the licence-granting powers of 
government decline, and as regulation is increasingly characterized by 
transparency, predictability and uniformity. All these factors weaken the 
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ability oflocal government to support its own firms. However, until markets 
for the key inputs of land and bank finance develop, and until transparent 
regulation and the rule oflaw are established, the advantages oflocal govern-
ment ownership are assumed still to outweigh the disadvantages. Given this, 
one would expect continued government ownership of TVEs until these 
conditions are met. But even if these conditions are met, local governments 
will still lack incentives to give up their control rights voluntarily. 
It is surprising, therefore, to find that local government ownership has 
faded away before significant marketization ofland and bank financing has 
taken place and, indeed, before the significant presence of the rule of law in 
areas such as licensing and regulation. Even more interestingly, TVE 
ownership reform has been initiated and led largely by local government. 
The next section examines why local governments have voluntarily given up 
important control rights over TVEs. 
EXPLAINING THE CHANGE IN TVE OWNERSHIP 
Two sets of factors have led to the shift in ownership patterns: 'supply-side' 
factors arising from within the economy and 'demand-side' factors emerging 
from wider society. The former are probably more important in triggering 
the reforms, as they have provided incentives for action by the major players, 
while demand-side factors have provided a supportive environment. The two 
incentives for the players are the desire of managers to recapitalize their firms 
and their desire to attract and retain skilled staff through employee share 
ownership. On the other side, there is evidence of a breakdown in the 
mechanism that allowed TVEs to function and prosper in the 1980s. 
The desire for recapitalization 
By year-end 1995, township-run TVEs had the highest average debt-asset 
ratio (68%) among enterprise types. Industrial SOEs had the second highest 
(66%), with village-run TVEs in third place (55%). Debt-asset ratios among 
private firms were low: 35% for joint-household firms and 25% for individual 
household firms. 12 Industrial SO Es tend to operate in more capital-intensive 
industries, and have received more equity investment from the state, making 
a direct comparison with TVEs unfair. However, these figures do show that 
both industrial SOEs and township-run TVEs were highly leveraged in 
19gs, while village-run TVEs were also building up high levels of debt. 
Comparable time-series data on debt-asset ratios are not available at the 
national level. However, we do have an illustration at the prefecture level, in 
Suzhou City, Jiangsu province. TVEs in Suzhou can be regarded as 
representative of the well-known 'Southern Jiangsu model', in which rural 
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firms have retained the original community ownership form until recently. 
In 1994, TVEs in Suzhou had an average debt-asset ratio of 6r.9%, similar to 
the national average of 62.8% in 1995· In 1980-85, TVEs in Suzhou tended to 
have healthy debt structures (with debt-equity ratios varying between 3fAi 
and 51%). However, their debt increased rapidly in the late 1980s, exceeding 
an average of 60% by 1992.13 Sun (1999) compared debt-asset ratios and per-
formance for III township-run TVEs in southernJiangsu in 1995· He found a 
significant positive correlation between the proportion ofloss-making firms 
in each group of firms with a similar debt-asset ratio and the group's debt-
asset ratio, indicating that TVEs with high debt-asset ratios not only had to 
cope with higher levels of debt servicing but also had a greater risk of 
business failure . 
Press reports and official documents also indicate that TVEs took on 
greater debt in the late 1980s, and this remained at unhealthy .levels into the 
early 1990s. There appear to have been two reasons for this. First, the entry of 
foreign-invested and private firms as well as more TVEs into markets 
previously monopolized by TVEs led to increased competition and an erosion 
of the exceptional profits of the early years. The ratio of post-tax profits over 
assets for TVEs decreased from more than 30% in the early 1980s to about 
7.5% in 1995 and 1996.14 Declining profitability forced TVEs to depend on 
greater amounts of debt financing. Second, and more importantly, following 
the rapid expansion of corporate groups of TVEs, the ability of local 
government (the de facto headquarters of the TVE group) to cross-subsidize 
its individual TVEs and to guarantee bank loans for them increased. This 
made it more feasible for TVEs to rely on debt financing. At the same time, 
information asymmetry problems between local government officials and 
TVE managers were increasing owing to the rapid expansion of community 
TVE conglomerates and the accompanying increase in bureaucracy. As a 
consequence, individual TVEs took advantage of the opportunity to exploit 
what was in effect a softening budget constraint and borrow more, with 
managers choosing higher-risk projects but reducing their effort to 
maximize firms' worth. rs 
The problem was that local governments themselves faced hard budget 
constraints, and the debt-maximizing behaviour of individual TVEs 
undermined local governments' budgets. In order to escape these liabilities 
(and to recapitalize the firms) the local governments that owned many highly 
leveraged TVEs had strong incentives to initiate ownership reforms. Before 
ownership reforms, profitable TVEs would be expected to lend funds to 
TVEs with a poorer performance. The opportunity cost of such lending is 
high because the likelihood of repayment is low and the lenders themselves 
·are likely to use the money more efficiently. In this sense, profitable TVEs 
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are losers ex post under government ownership. Ex ante, if there is a high 
probability that a TVE will be profitable, then the perceived value of the 
cross-subsidy will be negative.16 Therefore managers in profitable TVEs will 
have strong incentives to seek more autonomy, to improve the asset structure 
of their firms and to strengthen their competitive edge through ownership 
reform. For the managers of loss-making TVEs, the l.ncentives to push for 
ownership reform are different but also clear. Although they can benefit 
from the subsidies and loans provided by local government, they also face the 
pressures of declining reputation and being blamed for undermining local 
government finances and the threat of liquidation. Of course, once the firm 
is closed down, both managers and workers will lose their non-agricultural 
jobs, sources of both income and higher social status. However, if the firm 
continues in business, compensation for managers and workers will still be 
limited because of the firm's poor performance and debt burden. Therefore, 
managers in loss-making TVEs too have clear incentives to avoid 
bankruptcy and to increase their equity capital through ownership reform. 
The terms and conditions of ownership reforms are typically set by local 
governments and TVE managers. Employee stock ownership has played a 
prominent role in the reform of larger TVEs, thanks to the need to raise 
larger amounts of capital and to bolster support among insiders for reform. 
There are two main reasons why workers would support employee stock 
ownership. There should be general support among all workers for the 
scheme, whether they become owners of shares or not, as the increase in the 
equity capital of their firm boosts overall job security and should result in 
higher wages as well as more secure social welfare provision. In addition, 
support should of course come from the new employee shareholders, 
especially as the paid subscription of shares is often immediately rewarded by 
the distribution of 'matching shares' (peigu), distributed free of charge on a 
one-to-one or .two-to-one basis with the purchased shares. Together these 
shares generate future dividends for their owners, and can be traded within 
the local community and in some cases outside it too. Moreover, these shares 
bring the TVE workers partial control rights over the firm. As a result, TVE 
workers who have the right to subscribe to shares are usually strong 
supporters of employee stock ownership.'7 However, it is important to note 
that around a half of TVE workers, usually temporary workers from other 
areas, do not have the right to subscribe to TVE shares and therefore tend to 
feel dissatisfied with such restructuring.18 
The desire to promote human capital and attract outside investment 
To survive in what have become highly competitive product markets, TVEs 
have had to make a huge effort to overcome the comparative disadvantages 
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associated with their location in underdeveloped rural areas. The two major 
constraints have been, first, a shortage of professional managers, technicians 
and skilled workers and, second, a shortage of financial capital in general and 
equity capital in particular. During the 1980s, TVEs paid highly competitive 
salaries ~nd bonuses to attract professional managers and skilled workers. 
However, with increasing labour market competition (and thus higher levels 
of compensation) and liquidity constraints, greater numbers of TVEs have 
been unable to retain valuable staff with salaries alone. In such a situation, 
there are obvious benefits to including shares in the compensation packages 
of senior managers. Not only does this circumvent the hard liquidity 
constraint, it also introduces financial incentives for performance, enhances 
the loyalty of employees and should help to improve relations between 
management and employees.19 In this sense, employee stock ownership has 
generally been regarded as an effective means of promoting human capital 
development within TVEs. 
Incorporation and the distribution of shares for asset injections are also 
regarded as effective means of clarifying the relationship between local govern-
ments and the TVEs they own. This is important for attracting additional 
equity investment from outsiders. Once government rights over control and 
cash flows of the TVE are clearly defined as, and limited to, a proportion of 
a firm's shares, outside equity investors have credible assurance that they will 
receive returns proportional to their investment and that they will enjoy 
control rights proportional to their shares. Outside equity investment both 
helps to alleviate a shortage of capital and to 'open up' the governance of the 
firm. Too often TVEs have failed to grasp new growth opportunities or they 
have failed adjust to changes in the market place or to new technologies 
because their leadership has been too insular and they have lacked access to 
knowledgeable outsiders.'° The knowledge of outsiders is a valuable thing in 
a rapidly changing economy, a factor that has probably contributed to the 
increasing popularity of stock ownership in the TVE sector. 
The degeneration of the TVE 'mechanism' 
'Mechanism degeneration' (jizhi tuihua) refers to the phenomenon of 
increased rent-seeking behaviour and increased bureaucratic interference in 
the firm by local governments in areas with successful TVEs. In other words, 
these local governments are moving from providing a 'helping hand' to 
undermining their enterprises with a 'grabbing hand'. This phenomenon is, 
of course, not new and has been observed in many areas, even in the second 
half of the 1980s. 21 Increasing levels of public attention to this issue since the 
early 1990s, however, may well indicate that the public is becoming less 
tolerant of government predation and bureaucracy.22 This shift in climate 
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may have contributed greatly to the appeal of phasing out local government 
ownership. 
Local governments are not pure economic actors - they pursue multiple 
social, political and economic objectives. Even assuming a benevolent local 
government, its ownership of commercial firms creates several potential 
conflicts of interest. Although at the initial stages of growth the interests of 
the two sides (government and firm) are roughly compatible, their interests 
diverge as the firm matures. 23 Local governments tend to give priority to 
maximizing employment, and to boosting local growth and financial 
revenue. In contrast, the managers ofTVEs are most interested in firm-level 
efficiency and net profits. It is therefore possible that local officials will try to 
impose operational limits on their TVEs and thus hinder their long-term 
development. In some locales, officials have also shifted social responsi-
bilities onto individual firms, and, as a result, many firms have become 
· overstaffed and been financially drained by their social welfare burden. In 
such circumstances, managers have strong incentives for escaping local 
government control. 24 Another issue is, of course, rent-seeking on the part of 
local officials. Many successful TVEs have become 'purses' for their local 
governments, required to pay various sorts of expense for the government 
and its officials. In addition, manyTVE managers, in collusion with govern-
ment officials, have stripped firms' assets for their own use. 25 
A second set of problems is related to corruption and the problem of who 
monitors the monitors. Although there is some supervision by county-level 
government, as discussed by Che and Qian, this monitoring is limited in 
scope owing to problems with the incentives of officials and the information 
available to them. 26 Local officials are monitored and constrained only by 
local Communist Party branches, and this may well be inadequate because 
for most officials at grassroots level, there is only a small probability that they 
will be promoted. Indeed, compared with the economic and social rents they 
might enjoy from preying on local TVEs, the benefits of recruitment to the 
status of a low-ranking bureaucrat are not great. In addition, monitoring at 
the county-village level is further undermined by communication difficulties 
in rural areas as well as by the fact that there are usually a large number of 
TVEs in a single county.27 To solve the problem of monitoring management, 
joint-stock ownership (including employee stock ownership) has clear 
advantages, as it creates clear owners with an interest in the firm performing 
well. 
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TVE OWNERSHIP REFORM: FROM GOVERNMENT TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Since the mid-r99os, China's rural enterprises have quietly experienced a 
surge of ownership reforms. More than 800,000 TVEs had been fully 
privatized and more than 330,000 had been partly privatized by year-end 
2002. 28 In terms of numbers of firms, this amounts to many times more than 
the total number of privatizations in the rest of the world during the entire 
r99os. In addition to its magnitude, two other features of this privatization 
trend are worth noting. First, the most common form of ownership reform is 
insider privatization. Township and village governments almost always sell 
the majority of shares of their TVEs to insiders, specifically to the managers 
of the firm involved. 29 In contrast, the most popular privatization method in 
most other parts of the world has been to sell controlling stakes to groups of 
outsiders.30 Second, insider privatization generally failed to improve 
performance in Russia, and in central and east European countries, but even 
in the case of a change to sole proprietorship, large numbers (though not all) 
of China's TVEs have experienced improved performances.3' As a result, the 
overall performance of the sector has been outstanding. To understand why 
this has occurred, it is useful to look at the kinds of contractual mechanism 
that have been used to facilitate insider privatization. 
The first step in the privatization process is an assessment of the value of 
a firm's net assets. An evaluation team, usually organized by the local 
government, typically make the assessment based on the firm's book value. 
Once the firm's net asset value (NA V) has been deterinined, the second step 
is taken of setting a price. In some areas, auctions are employed to help the 
government to get the best deal. These sometimes take place at local 
property rights transactions centres. However, as government officials are 
often unwilling to sell enterprises to outsiders whose ability and background 
are unknown, the backgrounds of all bidders tend to be checked. In practice, 
only insiders and the close relatives or friends of insiders are successful 
buyers, even if outsiders' bids are higher. In many areas, the sale is deter-
mined by negotiations between government officials and the firm's managers. 
The negotiations over price start with the firm's NAV and work towards a 
consensus on the premium to be paid based on assumptions about the future 
profitability of the firm. 
Although this procedure does not vary much within and across regions, 
buy-out prices vary widely even within townships. Prices also show only a 
weak correlation with official NA Vs. Li and Rozelle report that, among 88 
TVEs privatized in 1994/ in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, 20 were sold 
to managers at a price higher than the NAV.32 However, another 21 firms 
were sold at a very low price (or even changed hands for nothing), despite the 
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fact that their NAV was on average 2.5 times greater than that of the 20 
firms. Seven firms had a negative NA V, but on average the new owners still 
paid Rmb200,ooo ($z4,ooo) for them. This indicates that in 3r% of the 
sample (z7 firms), the buyers paid a price exceeding the best ex ante estimates 
of the firm's NAV. 
Analysis by Li and Rozelle (20or) indicates as well that the normalized 
buy-out price (the premium paid on top of the NA V divided by the NA V) 
decreases with the degree of information asymmetry between insiders and 
local government. They find too that the post-privatization performance of a 
firm is positively correlated with the normalized buy-out price. Their research 
suggests that not all firms have improved their performance equally. Those 
whose buyers paid a premium on top of the NAV have achieved performance 
levels similar to private firms in terms of accounts receivable, value-added per 
worker and the manager's working hours. The performance of the firms 
which were sold at heavily discounted prices is indistinguishable from that of 
govemment-contr;lled firms. The performance of firms sold at a moderate 
discount falls between the two. These differences in post-sale performance 
are very likely the result of the different incentives provided to the new 
owners in the form of the different contractual terms of the privatization. 
· 'PRIVATIZATION WITH A TAIL' AS A SCREENING MECHANISM 
One of the biggest constraints on insider privatization in transition econo-
mies is the lack of a mechanism to determine a reasonable buy-out price. The 
government officials in charge of privatization typically do not have any 
accurate means of assessing how valuable a firm will become after control has 
been transferred to its management. Although the manager possesses insider 
information about the firm's profit potential, officials cannot rely on his 
valuation because there are substantial incentives on his part for understating 
the firm's value. It is also difficult to rely on the assessment of a third party as 
even basic accounting standards and practices tend to be underdeveloped in 
transition economies. Without any mechanism to reveal the firm's true 
value, officials often have to accept the price offered by the manager, usually 
resulting in the manager gaining a large windfall rent. This rent often under-
mines the incentives of the manager because if the firm is doing too well 
relative to the buy-out price, government officials are likely to ask for addi-
tional payments. In some extreme cases, a reversal of the privatization may 
actually take place because of popular disapproval of what are perceived as 
corrupt sales, as has been observed in Russia.33 
These constraints on information can partly be overcome by a 'screening 
contract'.34 Such a contract typically has two parts: a buy-out price and a 
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contingent payment due to the seller, the local government, in the form of a 
claim on the firm's future profits. The final contract is one in which the 
manager(s) pays a high price to acquire the firm completely and retain all or 
most of its future profits or it is one in which the manager(s) pays a lower 
price and must share any future profits with the government seller. The 
Chinese aphorism 'privatization with a tail' (gaizhi liuweiba) refers to this 
phenomenon of the local government claiming part of the firm's future 
profits if it is sold at a heavily discounted price. This appears to be a widely 
occurring phenomenon in China, concentrated in Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
provinces. Such a screening mechanism helps officials to elicit information 
from managers about the value of their firms. Good managers (or managers 
of high-quality firms) will choose high buy-out prices as they know that they 
can make substantial profits after sale and are therefore willing to pay a high 
price for a contract which grants them control of the firm's future profits. In 
contrast, poor managers (or managers oflow-quality firms) will choose low 
buy-out prices as they do not expect to make high profits and understand 
that they will have to share any that they do make with the government. 
The benefit of this screening mechanism is that it makes it possible for 
local governments to elicit important information about the value of the firm 
before the buy-out - as well as providing incentives to those managers who 
pay high prices to invest effort in their firm. The reverse side of the story is 
that the contract terms accepted by poor managers (or managers of low-
quality firms) provide only weak incentives, and this in turn may lead their 
firms to underperform after privatization. The empirical findings tend to 
support this prediction.JS 
REMAINING CHALLENGES TO TVE DEVELOPMENT 
TVE ownership reform in general, and the emergence of insider stock 
ownership in particular, have been effective in boosting the capital resources 
of TVEs as well as providing some protection from government predation; 
but these reforms are still ongoing, and they are uneven across the country. 
Large numbers of TVEs with diverse ownership and control structures have 
registered themselves as employee shareholding cooperatives, indicating that 
this term itself is now vague and varied in use. Another problem has been 
that government influence remains in many areas. Reports indicate that in 
some places 'privatization' is a transfer in name only for one-third of formally 
privatized TVEs.36 As Samuel Ho et al. reveal, in Wujin county, Jiangsu 
province, more than 70% of restructured TVEs were registered as 'employee 
shareholding cooperatives' in 1999 and 2000, but in fact only 30% of these 
firms had some actual resemblance to a cooperative, with shares held by both 
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employees and local government. Another problem has been the uneven 
development of political institutions at the grassroots level. This has 
hindered the healthy evolution of joint-ownership forms and the orderly 
phasing out of government ownership. The problem is often most serious at 
the village level, where powerful village heads (often the Party secretary) 
transfer the best collective assets to their private ownership. 
There are several other factors related to the development of China's 
rural economy that have constrained the development ofTVEs. It is worth 
noting three of them. The first is that in general the quality of management 
in rural areas tends to be low. Managers are typically from the local area, and 
have poor educational backgrounds; and even though they display a strong 
desire to develop their business, they often lack the management skills 
needed to deal effectively with market competition and the challenge of run-
ning efficient firms . In addition, the development of tools for good decision-
making has lagged behind the growth of the TVE sector. For example, 
owing to shortages of professional accountants, many TVE managers have 
no access to information generated by modern accounting practices, which 
in turn hinders them from making rational and timely business decisions.37 
The shortage of competent engineers and technicians has also undermined 
technological development at many TVEs. Second there is the question of 
scale. TVEs are typically locally initiated and locally based. In order to 
diversify the business risks they face, it is rational for a township or a village 
to establish several small-scale TVEs operating across a number of different 
sectors. However, in many industries small-scale production is simply not 
sustainable over the long term because other firms will expand and enjoy 
greate.r economies of scale and investment. Third, almost all TVEs were 
initiated by township and village governments, households and groups of 
households, and are based on local resources. This local identity has both 
benefits and costs. The comparative benefits include very low entry costs into 
non-agricultural industries and an ability to exploit local resources. However, 
the comparative costs are significant too . Rural industrialization has not yet 
induced meaningful urbanization. As a consequence, the development of 
TVEs is increasingly restricted by deficient rural infrastructure, a lack of 
professional services and poor transportation and communication networks. 
Furthermore, the ability of firms to develop their human capital will be more 
and more limited by pressures to employ local people, particularly those 
connected to powerful interests in the community, and by the dual role of 
many employees as both employees and farmers. 
Human capital development, the professionalization of management, an 
ability to grow to the optimum scale and the creation of infrastructure and 
urban services are all essential to the growth of China's TVEs. These challenges 
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cannot be solved by ownership reforms alone, although those reforms will 
certainly create a better institutional environment for tackling them. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has provided an overview of recent developments in TVE 
ownership reform in China. The most striking feature of these reforms has 
been the unexpected phasing out of local government ownership through 
joint-stock ownership involving managers, local government, employees and 
external equity investors. This has been driven by a number of factors, 
including the desire for the recapitalization of firms, the need for govern-
ments to insulate their budgets and the need for firms to offer shares to their 
managers. Differences between insider privatization within China's TVEs 
and similar sales in other countries were identified. Special attention was 
paid to the screening mechanism employed by governments to resolve the 
information asymmetries between themselves (the seller) and the managers 
(the buyers). By using a contract consisting of a buy-out price and a contin-
gent claim on future profits, local governments have been able to elicit 
information from the buyer about the firm's predicted future profitability. 
This contractual mechanism has helped local governments to maximize sales 
revenue and to separate good managers from poor ones (and high-quality 
firms from poor-quality ones). 
From a comparative perspective, joint-stock TVEs can be regarded as a 
hybrid of the closely held joint-stock firm common in the West and the 
collective TVE which preceded it. They aim to combine the profit incentives 
associated with individual ownership with the ·strengths inherent in the 
institutional and social capital embedded in township and village communi-
ties. Of course, the joint-stock model will be transitional in those cases where 
these firms grow out of the community and become openly held companies 
with outside shareholders. However, it is entirely possible that closely held 
firms will continue to be the dominant corporate form in China's rural 
economy, especially if the institutional and social capital of a rural commun-
ity continues to be valuable. The corporate governance challenges presented 
by firms whose shares are held by only a small group of investors are very 
different from those posed by firms with more open shareholder structures. 
In contrast to stock market-listed firms, their governance involves the use of 
multiple classes of share and various managerial networks; ownership and 
control are changed via multilateral negotiations; and different stakeholders 
seek informal means of influence. In all these areas, the social and institu-
tional capital held by the community can provide information advantages 
and cost-saving potential.38 
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During a transition process, ownership structures and governance 
mechanisms should ideally be 'adaptively efficient'. In other words, they 
need to provide enough flexibility so that firms' managers and owners can 
adapt to new market opportunities, absorb new know-hbw, have incentives 
for additional learning and be encouraged to take risks and engage in creative 
activities. The dynamic nature of institutional change involved in TVE 
insider privatization and the formation of employee stock ownership 
suggests that China's TVEs exhibit just this adaptive efficiency. Although 
their current ownership and governance forms may well be only transitional, 
some of them have a good chance of surviving beyond the transition period. 
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